In a research article in Journalism Practice, Simone Benazzo, Florence Le Cam, David Domingo, and Marie Fierens look at Germany, Croatia, and North Macedonia and analyse Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) as instruments for media capture. SLAPPs undermine not only individual journalists but the sustainability, independence, and impact of the media ecosystems journalism funders seek to strengthen.
SLAPPs are legal actions used to harass or intimidate people who speak on matters of public interest. Because they rely on legal tools rather than open threats or violence, they are often hard for journalists to fight. While countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia have had laws against SLAPPs for years, Europe has only recently taken steps in this direction following pressure from civil society and media groups.
Most academic work has focused on the legal structures that enable SLAPPs and on legal reforms that could stop them. Fewer studies have looked at their wider effects. The authors’ research seeks to understand the complexity of SLAPPs in Europe and the range of reactions to them. They view SLAPPs as a form of media capture, where governments or political and business interests try to control the media. In this sense, SLAPPs can contribute to autocratisation, a process in which countries become more autocratic even if they are still considered democracies.
They examined Germany, Croatia, and North Macedonia, three democracies with different recent trends in autocratisation and different levels of SLAPP activity. Through interviews and focus groups with journalists, lawyers, and activists, the authors explored the actors involved and the strategies they use. Their analysis shows five key dimensions of this struggle: juridical, political, professional, financial, and social.
Looking at the juridical dimension, focus group participants saw SLAPPs as an abuse of the court system that restricts freedom of expression. The independence of the judiciary influenced how often SLAPPs occurred. In Croatia, where trust in judicial independence is low, SLAPPs are frequent, and some judges even file cases against journalists. In Germany, the courts generally defend press freedom, but participants warned that this could create complacency and allow cases to go unnoticed. In North Macedonia, past SLAPPs were marked by arbitrary decisions before defamation was decriminalised. Today, judges tend to protect journalists, partly due to training and pressure from professional associations. Across countries, participants debated whether training judges is enough, noting that the main issue is sometimes not knowledge but attitudes towards journalism.
Political actors also play a central role in shaping SLAPPs. In Croatia, both national and local politicians often initiate lawsuits, supported by close ties with judges. In North Macedonia, the fall of the autocratic government in 2017 reduced SLAPPs, though other political pressures remain. Regulatory bodies and major broadcasters still reflect older power structures. In Germany, SLAPPs by politicians are less common, but the rise of the AfD party has increased hostility towards the press, leading to long and costly disputes. Some focus group participants argued that these pressures shape the wider public sphere. In North Macedonia, joint declarations between political and media actors have been used as a tool to prevent legal action against journalists.
Professional bodies play an important role in resisting SLAPPs. Journalists’ associations in all three countries collect data, offer support, and advocate for better protection. Croatian associations run rapid-response systems and annual surveys. North Macedonia’s association works to secure free legal aid and contributes to national and international monitoring tools. In Germany, focus group participants stressed self-regulation and the need for the profession to defend itself. Press councils, however, were seen as limited in their ability to help, except in North Macedonia where their opinions influence court cases. External actors, such as European media organisations, also support journalists through training, advocacy, and insurance schemes.
SLAPPs also have severe financial consequences. In Croatia, high damages and “serial plaintiffs” place heavy burdens on journalists and media outlets. Some lawsuits appear motivated by profit rather than reputation. Law firms also benefit by specialising in these cases. In North Macedonia, legal reforms have reduced fines, easing some pressure. Participants described how SLAPPs can drain resources, force media into crowdfunding, or even bankrupt people. This financial fear can lead to self-censorship, as editors may stop investigations to avoid costly cases. In Germany, some in the focus group suggested joint funds as a way to help journalists face legal costs.
Public awareness of SLAPPs is low in all three countries. Many people distrust journalists, which weakens sympathy for those targeted. Focus group participants in Croatia and North Macedonia described widespread suspicion of the media, while German participants stressed the need to report on SLAPPs openly to build understanding. Awareness campaigns were seen as essential, led by civil society or journalists’ associations. Croatian participants felt that public knowledge had improved thanks to their efforts, though others in Germany and North Macedonia were less optimistic.
The authors created a multi-dimensional model to show the links among all five dimensions. Journalists and media sit at the centre, while political actors, business figures, and legal actors use SLAPPs to pressure or silence them. The model also highlights how different forms of media capture connect to the wider processes of autocratisation.
The three countries studied show important differences. In all of them, politicians have filed SLAPPs, but only in Croatia and North Macedonia did these cases come from politicians close to the ruling parties. In these contexts, SLAPPs act as tools of autocratisation, used by those in power to weaken dissent. In Germany, the rise of the AfD suggests that similar pressures may appear in the future. Another striking finding concerns Croatia, where some judges themselves use SLAPPs. This shows how legal actors can sometimes reinforce autocratising trends instead of blocking them. The findings also confirm that financial actors, including law firms that specialise in SLAPPs, now play a major role.
The study also highlights that SLAPPs can be resisted. Journalists, professional groups, civil society, and some judges use different strategies, such as public awareness, legal support, and political pressure. These efforts differ from country to country and depend on local power relations, resources, and traditions of cooperation.
Benazzo, S., Le Cam, F., Domingo, D., & Fierens, M. (2025). Journalism Facing Autocratization: Analyzing Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) as Instruments for Media Capture. Journalism Practice, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2025.2598376
Media freedom in 2026 is once again set to face pressure from various political, financial, technological, and regulatory sources. Elections in the EU’s increasingly fraught democratic landscape, high-stakes debates over the shape and enforcement of digital regulation, and the use of AI will all profoundly influence the state of media freedom. As journalism funders play a crucial role in sustaining independent media, these developments may also directly or indirectly impact their work.
Digital Regulation: Debates Around the Digital Services Act (DSA)
The Digital Services Act (DSA), introduced to create a safer and more transparent online ecosystem, will remain a central point of debate both for its enforcement and its implications for freedom of expression. As the EU pushes forward with stringent platform obligations, the United States is pushing back, arguing that some elements could undermine free speech and impose extraterritorial burdens on US companies.
The DSA mandates algorithmic transparency, content moderation, and risk-mitigation measures. The US government argues, however, that these run counter to the American constitutional tradition, which generally prioritises minimal state involvement in speech regulation. As the European Commission ramps up enforcement, Big Tech companies such as Meta, X (formerly Twitter), and Google argue that the DSA’s risk-mitigation obligations will force them to make judgments that may appear political, especially during sensitive elections.
The outcome of this standoff will not only shape future platform governance but also the information environment surrounding upcoming elections.
Hungary’s 2026 Election
One of the most consequential events for media freedom in Europe this year will be the Hungarian parliamentary election on April 12, 2026, where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s illiberal regime faces its most serious challenge in over a decade. Orbán has been criticised for over a decade for controlling much of Hungary’s media landscape, characterised by pro-government propaganda networks and economic pressure on independent outlets, but his system remains a blueprint for other authoritarian leaders around the world.
The election will not only determine Hungary’s domestic media environment but may also have an influence on democratic resilience in other EU Member States where populist and illiberal actors are gaining ground. The result and the agenda of the next government will also influence the EU’s infringement procedures against Hungary for, among others, failing to comply with the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), meaning a test for EU legal mechanisms to uphold democratic standards.
The Use of AI and Deepfakes in Election Campaigns
Artificial intelligence, particularly generative AI capable of producing deepfakes, has moved from sci-fi speculation into becoming a serious factor in electoral politics. In 2026, this trend will be inseparable from broader debates about media freedom, electoral integrity, and digital regulation, including the EU’s forthcoming AI Act.
Deepfakes are AI-generated or AI-altered videos, images, or audio that mimic reality. They have already proliferated and influenced global elections. A study published last summer found that 38 countries have experienced election-related deepfake incidents in recent years.
The impact of deepfakes is not only important because of their reach, but because they damage public trust. By lowering the cost of producing convincing fake media, AI enhances what researchers call the “liar’s dividend,” where real footage can be dismissed as fake and real media loses credibility. For example, the upcoming Hungarian election is already being shaped by AI-generated political content, and the European Parliament voiced its concern over unlabelled AI-generated political videos published on social media channels tied to political parties.
While some governments are attempting to mitigate these risks by employing tools to detect deepfakes, technology alone cannot solve the problem: legal mechanisms and their enforcement are needed.
Harassment of Journalists and Self-Censorship
One of the most worrying recent global trends is the increase in physical and digital threats to journalists, which goes hand in hand with rising self-censorship and negatively affects media freedom.
According to the latest UNESCO World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development report, freedom of expression has declined significantly worldwide, accompanied by a steep rise in attacks on journalists. Governments and powerful actors have tightened control over traditional and digital media channels. Reporters are not only facing physical violence, but also surveillance, legal intimidation, and online harassment that undermines independent reporting and forces many to avoid sensitive topics altogether.
Economic Fragility
Another structural challenge that will undoubtedly shape media ecosystems in 2026 is the economic fragility of independent journalism. The 2025 World Press Freedom Index shows that the financial environment for journalism is at a historic low point: in 160 out of 180 countries, with media outlets struggling to sustain basic operations. Advertising revenue has shifted dramatically toward large tech platforms, leaving news organisations starved for funds. Newsrooms are shutting down worldwide, especially where political pressure compounds economic vulnerabilities, leading to news deserts where access to reliable news is severely limited.
The domination of global digital advertising by tech giants has not only diverted revenue but also amplified disinformation and manipulated online information environments, further destabilising independent media. In 2026, economic viability will be a defining battlefield for media freedom.
Artificial intelligence offers powerful tools while also putting new pressures on already fragile business models in journalism. While newsrooms can turn to AI to boost efficiency and reach audiences in new ways, they also have to face a significant decrease in traffic – and complex questions about who should pay for the journalism that fuels AI systems.
AI tools are reshaping journalism in many ways, and their impact on business models is becoming increasingly visible. Experts usually articulate both optimism and uncertainty surrounding these changes.
For example, Niamh Burns, Senior Research Analyst in Tech and Media at Enders Analysis, describes the current situation as “a mixed bag.” Veronika Munk, Director of Innovation and New Markets at Denník N, notes that every newsroom she knows already uses AI in some form. There is even a sense of fear of missing out, she says, as newsrooms rush to try new tools, but “only a few look at success metrics,” and follow whether these tools deliver the results they expect.
The Benefits of AI in Newsrooms
Despite this lack of clarity, certain benefits of AI are evident. AI tools can help news outlets respond more quickly to their audiences, operate more efficiently, and personalise their products. They also give news organisations new ways to tell stories, reach audiences through different formats, and create products that have the potential to bring in more revenue. One clear example is the use of AI tools for tagging, which Munk describes as particularly helpful for search engine optimisation and direct email campaigns, both of which are essential for maintaining and growing readership. Other examples include automated social media posting, translation, and transcription tools, both from audio to text and vice versa.
Burns highlights that AI tools can become especially valuable for data journalists. These tools make it possible to analyse large datasets far more quickly and with fewer resources, which means even small newsrooms can attempt investigations that would previously have been out of reach. She also points out that “AI can also help with the multiplatform distribution model,” making it easier to prepare audio, video, or social media versions of a single story. In many cases, these new formats lead to higher user engagement and, with that, a greater chance of converting casual readers into subscribers.
Some organisations are already using AI to write headlines that perform better in search engines or to translate stories into new languages. This allows them to reach audiences they have never served before. Burns, however, warns against taking personalisation too far. While AI can support more sophisticated recommendation systems, journalism has always been shaped by editorial judgement, and she argues that this cannot be fully delegated to algorithms. Editors must still decide which stories matter most.
Munk takes a practical view of these developments. If a newsroom can save time on routine tasks, she says, then there is more capacity for journalistic work, and this ultimately strengthens the product. She has also seen AI tools directly contribute to higher revenue. “We have a lot of campaigns, and this tool, Manychat, a social media client, is really useful,” she explains. Denník N integrated the tool into Instagram, where sharing links is not possible. However, when the outlet partnered with The New York Times and bundled subscriptions, users could comment “New York Times” on an Instagram post and they immediately received an automated direct message with the subscription link. Munk explains that they have been using this tool for half a year and “the conversion rate is quite high sometimes.”
Another important contribution of AI is its ability to analyse audience behaviour. By identifying trends in topics, formats, or publishing times that perform best, AI tools can guide editors as they shape content strategies. These insights help balance public interest journalism with the need to produce stories that draw enough attention to sustain the business.
Still, as Munk notes, while some outlets may think about monetising the tools they develop, most are building similar systems for internal use, such as summarisation tools or language checkers. This means the competitive advantage often lies not in creating unique tools, but in deploying them thoughtfully.
Risks to Traffic and Visibility
At the same time, concerns about the risks AI poses to journalism have been steadily growing. Many of these concerns arise from the simple fact that the business model for news media was already fragile long before AI tools became widespread. Burns explains that publishers originally put their content online for free because they expected to earn money from advertising. That model has been faltering for a decade, but, as she says, “with AI, we see a further challenge: news organisations not getting clickthrough traffic as before.”
This is indeed the main concern for news media. While tech companies have relied heavily on news content to train large language models, now search engines and chatbots answer many queries directly. This means that even when users seek reliable information, they may not reach the website that produced it. Studies already show that the clickthrough rate for Google’s AI-generated summaries is dramatically lower than for traditional search results – Tollbit, for example, found a 91% decrease. Furthermore, Cloudflare reported that OpenAI scraped a news site hundreds of times for every single referral page view it sent.
Publishers see a pattern in this: while their content helps power AI tools, their own visibility shrinks. According to a study by the Reuters Institute, 74% of respondents are worried about a decline in referral traffic for their news organisation.
The impact is not equal across newsrooms. Munk notes that Denník N feels the decline in clickthrough traffic less because of their hard paywall model. Still, it can be a serious problem for outlets that rely heavily on advertising, she adds.
This has serious consequences. As audience behaviour changes, more people turn to AI-powered search engines and chatbots. For many publishers, disintermediation, the loss of direct connection with audiences, is becoming the greatest fear. Younger audiences, who already have weaker ties to traditional news brands, are drifting even further away.
Therefore, Burns argues that newsrooms “need to build direct engagement with their audience,” also because nobody knows how these tools will evolve. They change constantly as tech companies adjust their products to improve user experience. The figures and patterns we see today may shift again in as little as a few months.
Legal Battles and Licensing
Against this backdrop, publishers are trying to rethink how they can adapt. Some believe that they may eventually need to distinguish between human readers and AI agents. As The Atlantic’s CEO, Nicholas Thompson, argued at a conference, they need to identify who is visiting the site so that the organisation can decide how to monetise that interaction. He imagines showing different products or even blocking access in some cases.
You could block AI crawlers, Burns says, but then you face the “problem of losing visibility, because users will still go to these tools to search for information.” Therefore, blocking may protect content, but it also deepens the risk of disappearing from public view.
There is also a broader ethical and economic issue. AI companies rely heavily on the quality of journalistic work, which depends on careful fact-checking, verification and editorial judgement. A white paper published last year by News Media Alliance confirmed that journalistic content is among the most frequently used sources for AI systems. Yet much of this use happens without permission or payment. Burns asks whether it is possible to create an incentive structure where AI companies pay for content. Her answer is cautious: “It’s very patchy at the moment.”
Some publishers have responded with legal action. The New York Times has sued OpenAI for copyright violations, while Dow Jones and the New York Post have taken action against Perplexity.
Others have chosen partnership. A number of news organisations have already agreed to licensing deals. Burns sees “some development in the content of such deals, they are more sophisticated.” She believes that the companies should pay the newsrooms not only for historical, but also for ongoing access.
Survey data from the Reuters Institute shows that almost four in ten publishers expect licensing income from AI companies to become significant. Most, however, prefer collective deals that support the entire sector, rather than each newsroom negotiating its own terms.
Munk agrees that AI companies need journalistic content, and she sees licensing as essential for the future. “It doesn’t work otherwise. If you use something, you need to pay for it,” she argues. Burns also believes that licensing is the right path but warns that not every market will benefit equally. Large English-language publishers have more leverage, while smaller organisations will struggle. She argues that this imbalance shows why “regulatory intervention is needed here, not just ad hoc deals.”
At the same time, the growing value of human editorial oversight may become a strength for publishers who emphasise accuracy, verification, and accountability. Munk notes that journalists are responsible for the content they produce, and this responsibility gives this type of content greater value. Outlets that maintain strong editorial standards, she says, will stand out in the information environment.
Looking ahead, many argue that publishers, journalists, and tech companies should work together to understand how different forms of journalism contribute to the AI value chain. This understanding will be essential for building sustainable business models in the next era of journalism.
In a research article published in Journalism, Wilson Lowrey and Anna Grace Usery examine the adoption and adaptation of standards by local news collaborations and digital startups.
Local journalism is changing, with digital start-ups and news collaborations now creating new ways of working. These efforts often bring fresh standards that focus on ethics, quality, diversity, and community involvement. Such standards can be set by news outlets themselves, or by non-profits, research centres, or professional associations. They may consist of formal rules or more general principles, making them flexible and widely adopted. In a disrupted media field, standards help build trust, guide daily work, and give legitimacy to new players. Studying them reveals both their promise and their pitfalls.
Research into local journalism suggests several reasons why standards may be adopted in digital start-ups and news collaborations. Larger organisations often create more detailed standards because complexity makes it hard to predict outcomes, and flexible standards are easier to follow than strict rules. Collaborations with many members, each with their own aims, are especially likely to adopt broad guidelines that stress values such as ethics, diversity, or independence, rather than detailed instructions about operations. Younger outlets may not yet have many standards, while older ones could either have more specific rules tied to their mission or, because of complex connections with others, broader and less defined principles.
Outside groups such as civic organisations, associations, or research centres often influence these standards. Their guidelines tend to be abstract and focused on professional values rather than technical details. This means that collaborations with non-news members are less likely to adopt rules from news producers and more likely to follow general ethical or professional codes.
Business models also matter. Commercial outlets, under pressure to run efficiently, are more likely to stress operational rules. Non-profit outlets, by contrast, tend to focus on ideals like ethics and diversity and often have more standards overall, though they are less likely to demand strict compliance. Standards can also grow stronger when outlets focus on accountability journalism, since such work invites scrutiny and pushes organisations to show legitimacy through clear commitments.
To test these ideas, the study examined websites and published standards from a range of news collaborations and digital start-ups, including both non-profit and commercial outlets. These newer forms of journalism were chosen because they are most likely to look for legitimacy and support.
Most of the news sites studied had at least one set of standards, though some had more than one. These standards covered a wide range of themes, from ethics and diversity to community engagement and operational rules. Many outlets, especially non-profits, drew on outside organisations, such as professional associations or civic groups, for guidance. This shows how standards often spread beyond newsrooms and take shape in broader networks. Yet regrettably, many outlets treated standards more as symbols of legitimacy than as rules to be followed. In many cases, websites gave little sign of standards, or listed principles that were not clearly relevant to their specific mission.
When looking at the initial hypotheses, the results of the research were mixed. Larger news producers were not more likely to have extensive standards, nor did their standards focus more on abstract values, so both size-related predictions failed. The age of the outlet also showed no clear link with relevance of standards. The role of non-news partners proved weaker than expected: their presence did not increase the adoption of outside standards, nor did it push collaborations towards abstract principles.
Non-profit status mattered more. While non-profits were not necessarily more likely to frame their standards around broad principles, they were more likely to demand compliance and to have standards overall, especially when counting individual ones. Commercial outlets generally had fewer. The strongest and most consistent result was linked to accountability. Outlets that defined their mission around holding power to account had more standards, both in number and scope, and were far more likely to publish them.
This research showed that standards are easy to adopt and that they help newer organisations build legitimacy. Outlets that focused on accountability journalism were especially likely to adopt standards, perhaps because challenging the powerful invites criticism, making it important to show a public commitment to ethics and professionalism.
Outside organisations such as professional associations and networks appeared to shape the wider environment by offering sets of standards, but local outlets often adopted them loosely. Many principles were broad, not directly linked to the outlet’s mission or community. In fact, more than 40% of individual standards were judged not especially relevant to the producer’s local role, and on many sites, standards were either buried or not linked at all. This points to a degree of “decoupling,” where standards serve more as outward symbols than as tools for guiding daily practice.
The findings suggest that, while standards offer a useful framework, they risk becoming empty if not tied to the outlet’s own values and needs. Journalists and managers should think carefully about whether their standards reflect the priorities of their communities or mainly echo the agendas of outside organisations. For standards to strengthen trust, they must be meaningfully integrated into everyday reporting rather than left as vague, symbolic statements.
Lowrey, W., & Usery, A. G. (2025). The spread of news standards: Examining an emerging means for control and legitimacy in local journalism. Journalism, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849251362463
In an article published in the International Journal of Communication, Sebastian Sevignani, Hendrik Theine, and Mandy Tröger offer a new theoretical framework for analysing different forms of direct and indirect influence of Big Tech on news media by expanding the concept of media capture to media environment capture.
Powerful tech companies, especially US-based ones such as Meta and Google, are shaping journalism worldwide. They not only distribute news but also control the digital systems that decide what people see. This growing influence, which the authors call media environment capture, goes beyond ownership concentration: tech giants shape the entire information space. While researchers tend to focus on national cases or mix up different types of influence, this study suggests a broader way to understand how tech companies use both economic and technological power to shape journalism and public debate across countries and regions.
The idea of media capture originally described how governments influence media, despite laws protecting press freedom. This can happen through ownership, financial support, regulation, or corruption, usually leading to more positive coverage of the government. Over time, private companies and advertisers have also used similar tactics, buying media outlets or influencing content through advertising.
At the same time, with the rise of digital media, traditional media lost much of their advertising income to tech companies, leaving many outlets struggling financially and sometimes owned for political reasons instead of profit. Meanwhile, tech giants such as Google have become both funders of journalism and providers of essential tools which news outlets rely on, resulting in media environment capture.
To better understand the concept, the authors combine and apply interdisciplinary theories. They apply the theory of intellectual monopolisation, which focuses on the capabilities of digital conglomerates to absorb and claim knowledge, information, and data, influencing other industries including news media. They also borrow from critical state theory, offering conceptual clues as to how corporations influence media regulation. They also look at more recent theories of capitalism to understand how Big Tech harnesses the underpinnings of journalism.
Media environment capture explains how these tech giants create dependencies that make it hard for news organisations to function independently. On one hand, Big Tech provides funding to media outlets and journalism projects, sometimes to ease tensions with traditional media companies over advertising revenues. On the other, they also shape state media laws by spending millions on lobbying and supporting think tanks and research institutions, particularly in the European Union and the United States, which helps them steer debates on regulations and protect their business interests.
Furthermore, tech companies shape journalism practices through the platforms they provide, such as Facebook, through which they dominate news distribution and advertising. Through services like Google Analytics and Facebook Insights, tech companies control how media outlets understand and reach their audiences. Because so much news is consumed online, often through these platforms, journalists must adapt their content to fit algorithms and user data collected by Big Tech. This dependency forces them to adjust to the business models and distribution methods of tech giants, reducing their independence and changing journalism itself.
But news outlets also depend on Big Tech services and technologies to organise their daily work. Journalists use tools like Google Search, WhatsApp, and Teams for research and communication, while also relying on platforms like Facebook Instant Articles to share content.
The power of Big Tech comes from building large-scale hardware and software infrastructures and collecting vast amounts of user data, which they use to shape the digital public sphere. The concept of media capture, which focuses on ownership and financing, is no longer enough to explain their influence. Instead, the broader idea of media environment capture shows how their influence affects every part of news production and distribution.
As a result, media policies should be rethought by looking beyond single companies and instead considering how to reorganise the entire digital public sphere to protect independent journalism.
Sevignani, S., Theine, H., & Tröger, M. (2025). Unpacking Property: Media, Ownership, and Power in Transformation| Toward Media Environment Capture: A Theoretical Contribution on the Influence of Big Tech on News Media. International Journal of Communication, 19, 21. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/21987
Combining EU and philanthropic funding, the Investigative Journalism for Europe (IJ4EU) fund has become a model for supporting cross-border investigative journalism with high impact. With 90% public and 10% private funding, the fund has helped expose corruption, influence policy decisions, and protect press freedom, offering donors a vehicle for meaningful media impact.
The recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union to outlaw so-called “golden passport” schemes that allowed foreigners to buy EU citizenship marked a significant victory for investigative journalism. In its ruling, the court referred to the work of journalists who had exposed the abuse and malicious intent often underpinning these schemes.
The investigation was only one of many high-profile stories supported by IJ4EU, an initiative dedicated to strengthening cross-border watchdog reporting across the continent.
Launched in 2018, the IJ4EU fund backs investigative journalism that crosses national boundaries, reflecting the transnational nature of pressing public interest issues. The fund is operated by a consortium of four independent organisations committed to press freedom: the International Press Institute (IPI), which leads the consortium, the European Journalism Centre (EJC), the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), and Arena for Journalism in Europe.
Timothy Large, Director of Independent Media Programmes and IJ4EU manager at the IPI, underscores the programme’s success. “The jury is no longer out. This model works,” he says. By combining public and private funds, IJ4EU channels money into “the highest quality investigative journalism without compromising editorial independence.” According to Large, 90 percent of the funding comes from the European Commission, while 10 percent is contributed by philanthropies such as Adessium, Fritt Ord, and Isocrates Foundations, as well as the City of Leipzig. Previous donors also include Luminate and Open Society Foundations.
“Implementers make sure that editorial independence is at the heart of the programme,” he adds. IJ4EU’s model of “cascading grants” allows taxpayer and foundation money to flow via neutral intermediaries, with the consortium partners performing the intermediary function. Independent juries select all projects for funding. “All donors can have confidence that recipients are of high quality, while grantees can be sure that there are no strings attached,” Large highlights.
IJ4EU focuses on cross-border reporting. “Big issues nowadays require time and investment and are beyond borders: climate change, migration, corruption,” Large explains.
The demand for such support has been overwhelming: since its inception, IJ4EU has received applications from 1,526 teams seeking over €43 million in funding. It has distributed €6 million to 226 teams, involving more than a thousand journalists working on complex investigations.
An independent external evaluation report of the initiative found that it has made a significant contribution to improving the media ecosystem and, in turn, to fostering a more well-informed public.
IJ4EU offers targeted support through two primary grant schemes. The Investigation Support Scheme, managed by IPI, provides up to €50,000 to carry out resource-intensive investigations. The Freelancer Support Scheme, overseen by EJC, offers up to €20,000 to teams led by freelance journalists.
In addition to the grants, the scheme offers mentoring, training, and legal counselling to address the distinct challenges they face. Large describes the offering as a “full package,” noting that legal assistance and technical support are essential, as legal threats, including SLAPPs (strategic lawsuits against public participation) and defamation suits, have increased. “Weaponisation of legal risks has a chilling effect,” he says, adding that covering such complex topics sometimes also demands mentoring and help with finding partners.
The Fund’s independent external evaluation highlights that its training, mentorship, legal, and editorial support have significantly strengthened journalists’ professional resilience. Many beneficiaries, particularly freelancers, report feeling better equipped and protected in pursuing public interest investigations.
IJ4EU has seen a wide range of topics among grant applications. Many focus on stories related to climate change or the environment, Large explains, adding that since 2022, many teams have started framing their investigations through a security lens; partly to appeal to funders. Stories about EU borders have also been frequent.
Geographically, applications have come from every EU Member State and candidate country, with particularly strong proposals from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, he says. There are many applications also from Eastern and Southeastern Europe, with a noticeable rise from Ukraine.
“Some stories have had tremendous impact,” Large says, citing examples such as the story about the Maltese golden passport scheme, or an investigation into corruption in the Danube Delta that resulted in the suspension of EU funds and an OLAF inquiry. The independent external evaluation also confirms that IJ4EU-backed investigations consistently spark responses from policymakers and businesses and are often quoted by other major media. The programme has been particularly impactful in Eastern Europe, where independent journalism often faces more severe threats. These stories are also “building trust in watchdog journalism as a public good,” Large adds.
At the same time, he acknowledges that while IJ4EU has achieved much, it faces various challenges. Fundraising, for example, remains a concern. “It is wonderful to be able to provide this amount, but there is need for more,” he says, describing current support as “a drop in the ocean,” particularly in the context of the worsening funding landscape.
On a human level, he points to the psychological toll investigative journalism can take. Many of these stories are stressful, and there is “a lot of burnout and anxiety among journalists, even trauma,” he notes. Cross-border cooperation, while essential, can also be difficult to manage.
Participating foundations recognise that “independent media is a cornerstone of democracy,” Large says, adding that IJ4EU is a “safe and impactful way of getting into funding journalism.” He hopes that the programme will not only continue, but attract more philanthropic support, as there is a huge demand for such grants. Looking ahead, he imagines a possible future expansion: “Dreaming big, maybe one day the model can be expanded beyond Europe, to become global, because it really works.”
Media freedom in 2025 will be influenced by a combination of political, economic, technological, and regulatory factors. Key developments include Donald Trump’s inauguration, intensifying political and economic pressure on newsrooms, the outcome of the war in Ukraine, the development of new technologies – especially AI – and critical regulatory milestones like the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA).
The Inauguration of Donald Trump
Donald Trump has been re-elected as President of the United States, and his contentious relationship with the press and potential policies to limit or discredit critical media could set the tone for global press freedom. His first term was marked by hostility towards the media, and in 2020 alone, over 600 attacks on journalists were registered. Trump has openly supported such violence, framing journalists as adversaries.
In his second term, Trump and his allies aim to further politicize federal institutions like the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Plans allegedly include leak investigations, espionage charges against journalists, and potential reforms to libel laws to target critical reporting. The DOJ’s new regime may amplify prosecutions of journalists. Meanwhile, a Trump-led FCC could revoke broadcast licenses, consolidate conservative media ownership, and punish critical networks. Beyond legal and institutional threats, journalists face a chilling effect through self-censorship, as already shown before the election. The selection of the new director of Voice of America, a fierce Trump-ally who called journalists “monsters,” strengthens these fears.
One of the first executive orders signed after the inauguration also raises these fears: President Trump suspended all U.S. foreign assistance programs for 90 days, pending reviews of whether they align with the new administration policy goals. It is yet to be seen how it will impact journalism programs funded by the U.S. government.
Furthermore, Meta announced the discontinuation of its third-party fact-checking program, raising concerns about an even more significant proliferation of misinformation on Facebook and Instagram. X (formerly Twitter) has also reduced content moderation significantly, leading to an increase in hate speech and misinformation on the platform. Meanwhile, U.S. tech groups have been urging Trump to pressure the EU to scale back its investigations into global tech companies. Although these investigations are based on the EU’s digital markets regulations, a review has been initiated, which could indicate that the EU may be less inclined to enforce those regulations.
Political and Economic Pressure on Newsrooms
Political and economic pressures on newsrooms may intensify around the globe in 2025. Trump’s victory could encourage other populist leaders to further erode democratic norms, including the freedom of the press. Populist rhetoric frequently casts journalists as adversaries of the state, undermining trust in media and often resulting in restrictive measures against independent journalism, including digital surveillance or even legal restrictions. The latter may include legislation against “fake news,” which, often vaguely defined, enables governments to arbitrarily penalize critical reporting with fines or even imprisonment.
At the same time, economic challenges further threaten media sustainability. Rising operational costs and diminished advertising revenues have forced many outlets, particularly smaller and independent ones, to find new strategies to secure revenue or face closure. Nevertheless, in the distorted media landscapes of many countries, where ad revenue is allocated based on political loyalty rather than audience reach, and some audiences are already struggling with subscription fatigue, the role of external funding from philanthropies and other organisations will be critical.
The Outcome of the War in Ukraine
Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted how disinformation and propaganda are used to undermine public trust in institutions, including the media. In authoritarian and hybrid regimes, state-controlled narratives already dominate, but democracies might also adopt stricter regulations to combat disinformation, inadvertently creating challenges for legitimate journalism. The war has also made journalism more dangerous, with reporters targeted in conflict zones and online harassment becoming widespread.
At the same time, however, the war has also inspired innovation in independent journalism. Ukrainian media outlets have started to leverage crowdfunding and partnerships. Still, independent media in Ukraine face the difficulties of navigating donor dependence, operational challenges, and the urgent need for more sustainable funding models.
Emerging Technologies
New technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), may shape media freedom in 2025 in various ways. On one hand, the development of generative AI tools is likely to fuel a surge in the number of misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Sophisticated AI models can easily create deepfakes, fabricate convincing narratives, and flood digital platforms with content that erodes public trust in credible news sources, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish fact from fiction. As authoritarian regimes and other actors with bad intent exploit these technologies, independent journalism may face new threats, including orchestrated smear campaigns that undermine its integrity and credibility.
On the other hand, the same AI technologies hold promise for empowering journalists and enhancing the reach of independent media. Investigative journalists can harness AI for tasks like analysing vast datasets, uncovering corruption, or mapping networks of influence. Automated fact-checking tools might help counter misinformation, providing journalists with tools to quickly validate claims. Personalized front pages can help audiences access relevant, high-quality journalism tailored to their needs. Still, these tools also introduce ethical challenges, as overreliance on AI for reporting and editorial decisions risks eroding the human judgment central to true journalism.
Regulation Milestones
Regulatory milestones anticipated in 2025 may reshape the operational landscapes of both traditional and digital media. The European Union will see the full implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), which aim to create transparent and accountable frameworks for protecting editorial independence, tackling disinformation, and promoting media pluralism. However, their success will depend on consistent application across Member States.
Globally, debates around platform governance, particularly concerning Meta, Google, and X (formerly Twitter), will affect how media outlets interact with these tech giants. Issues such as content moderation and removal, revenue-sharing models, and the spread of harmful content are central, as these platforms often act as gatekeepers for news dissemination. The DSA’s provisions, which require platforms to notify media providers before removing legal content, could set a precedent for similar regulations worldwide, but their implementation could vary depending on national contexts.
Furthermore, agreements or discord in forums like the G20 regarding AI regulation will also influence the field of combating misinformation and the potential misuse of surveillance tools. As AI-generated content becomes more prevalent, governments face the dual challenge of mitigating harm without stifling innovation.
While the new moderate government in Poland has taken steps to restore media pluralism and increase media freedom, experts stress that true reform requires more than policy shifts. Restoring trust and fostering genuine media diversity will be a prolonged effort, offering critical lessons for countries struggling with illiberal governments and their legacies.
In October 2023, after eight years under the governance of the right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland witnessed a significant shift in the political landscape as voters turned out in record numbers to elect a new moderate government led by Donald Tusk. The election followed a period during which there was a notable decline in media freedom and independence. Upon assuming power in 2015, PiS promptly sought to consolidate control over state-owned media, transforming them into instruments of government propaganda. The party introduced legislation that gave it the authority to appoint management for state-controlled broadcasters and agencies, effectively transforming TVP, Polish Radio, and the PAP news agency into mouthpieces. The impact on media pluralism was significant, with consequences extending beyond the state sector.
The government’s influence extended to private media outlets, as evidenced by the 2021 acquisition of Polska Press by state-owned oil company PKN Orlen. Following the acquisition, numerous editors were dismissed, resulting in a shift in the publication’s editorial stance to align with the government’s perspective.
The government installed following the 2023 elections has committed to implementing measures to restore media pluralism. However, Michał Głowacki, an associate professor at the University of Warsaw, highlights that Poland’s media landscape remains polarised, split into “two competing media tribes.” This polarisation is further compounded by opacity in media ownership, which complicates assessments of genuine pluralism. Despite the new government’s pledge to increase pluralism, tangible results remain elusive, according to Głowacki, who adds, “I would like to see much more discussion about restoring media pluralism.”
One of the most significant actions was directed at the public service broadcaster, TVP. During the PiS administration, TVP became associated with far-right propaganda, prompting criticism from the European Union and numerous international organisations promoting media freedom. In December 2023, shortly after the Tusk government assumed power, Poland’s culture minister took prompt action to replace the leadership of TVP with a new management team. While this decision has been welcomed as a catalyst for change, it has also attracted criticism. Those in support of the former administration and a number of human rights organisations have expressed concerns about the precedent this sets. Głowacki highlights that public media has historically been susceptible to political influence, irrespective of the governing party, making it a contentious issue that dates back to the 1990s.
Marcin Gadziński, Program Director for Europe at the Media Development Investment Fund (MDIF), believes that while TVP no longer operates as a blatant propaganda machine, there is still room for improvement in terms of achieving a more balanced content output. “There are better journalists now, and the decision-making positions are filled by people with good reputations,” he states. However, he also notes that certain topics remain off-limits, and the TV station rarely criticises the government. Głowacki agrees that TVP’s current state is far from optimal, particularly with regard to the need for more adaptive strategies in light of the evolving media landscape and the emergence of multigenerational public service media.
The challenges associated with this transformation extend beyond editorial policy. As Gadziński notes, the dismissal of hundreds of employees from TVP has created a significant shortage of qualified journalists and editors, often drawing talent away from independent outlets and making it more challenging for those outlets to retain skilled professionals.
The issues do not solely affect the public service broadcaster. The two largest private broadcasters in Poland, TVN and Polsat, are also facing their own set of challenges. Warner Bros. Discovery’s plan to sell TVN Group has prompted speculation about potential buyers, including the Czech PPF group and an American broadcaster, as well as a Hungarian billionaire with close ties to Fidesz, the party of Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a close ally of PiS. Gadziński questions the likelihood of such a sale to Orban-linked interests, noting that “Orban-related business groups are already active in the area, looking for opportunities, but would an American mega-corporation sell something to them? I doubt so.” Nevertheless, he also states that nothing is impossible.
Other significant stakeholders in this challenging situation are Orlen Press, which oversees the largest group of regional newspapers in Poland, and Ruch, the second-largest newspaper distributor, both of which are owned by PKN Orlen, the state oil company. Despite reports that Orlen is considering divesting its media holdings, there have been few public developments. Gadziński suggests that even if Polska Press were sold, its reputation, tarnished by political appointments and disregard for market trends, would be difficult to rebuild. Głowacki believes that selling these assets would not significantly change the landscape, as “people don’t really buy their newspapers anymore.”
State-controlled advertising funds represent another key factor influencing the Polish media landscape. Tadeusz Kowalski’s analysis of Kantar Media data demonstrated that state-owned enterprises allocated a considerable portion of their advertising budgets to media outlets that reflected the government’s narrative. This practice, which aimed to maintain favourable coverage while limiting the financial viability of critical outlets, attracted significant criticism from international media freedom advocates. Głowacki states that, as yet, there is no updated data available on whether these practices have undergone a change under the new administration.
In the coming period, the challenges to restoring media pluralism are significant. Gadziński states that PiS embedded “landmines” throughout the system before leaving office, presenting the current administration with a dilemma: whether to move ahead and “lose some limbs”, or to navigate cautiously and make compromises. The issue of reclaiming public media without controversy is a significant one. “How else could public media have been taken back? No idea,” Gadziński said, emphasising the importance of leadership by individuals of integrity for the implementation of long-term solutions. “My advice for other countries in similar situations is to put such people in [those] positions.”
The Polish media landscape remains highly fragmented, reflecting a broader cultural and trust deficit. Głowacki highlights that the absence of a “common space for deliberation” intensifies polarisation, which legislation is unable to resolve on its own. The path to media reform needs more than just new regulations; it requires a significant cultural transformation to rebuild trust and foster an environment conducive to pluralism.
Nevertheless, these developments offer international journalism funders valuable insights. As Gadziński points out, providing support to independent media may be proving to be a sound investment. “Poland survived eight years because of the power of independent media,” which was the most robust in the region, as some international media groups are still active in the country. He adds that “a strong independent media is a battle worth fighting.”
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) represent a growing threat to press freedom, as powerful entities abuse legal systems to silence criticism and investigative reporting. While overt threats like physical violence also persist, legal intimidation has become increasingly prevalent, aiming to suppress independent voices and shield the powerful from scrutiny.
These lawsuits, primarily aimed to intimidate, target journalists and media outlets, alongside activists and NGOs. Perpetrators, often well-resourced individuals or institutions, exploit their advantage to exhaust their targets financially and emotionally. While some SLAPPs are eventually dismissed, the prolonged litigation process inflicts significant harm on journalists, distracting them from work and causing reputational damage. Even news organisations that win these lawsuits face pyrrhic victories, as the ordeal exacts a toll on their resources and wellbeing.
SLAPPs have become a tool to suppress dissent even in democratic countries. The European Commission has responded with an anti-SLAPP Directive adopted by the European Parliament in February 2024. The directive aims to safeguard public participation against legal abuse. However, the complex nature of SLAPPs requires ongoing research and concerted efforts to protect press freedom and democratic values.
The rise of SLAPPs has led to a shrinkage of investigative journalism, with media owners and editors often pressuring for simpler stories due to the financial burden of lawsuits. Journalists face self-censorship and editorial pressure, prompting many of them to become more reluctant when pursuing investigations. While some journalists continue their work unabated, others become more cautious and seek approval from their legal department before publication.
SLAPPs also impose significant restrictions on press freedom in general, with journalists facing economic intimidation and the fear of job loss. Therefore, self-censorship becomes prevalent as journalists weigh the consequences of their reporting, affecting both their professional practices and willingness to cover sensitive issues.
SLAPPs also impact journalists’ professional and personal lives on multiple levels. Concerns about future employment, the time-consuming nature of legal proceedings, and the psychological toll on journalists and their families are all significant factors. Lack of support from employers and colleagues exacerbates the situation although international press freedom organisations often provide practical assistance.
Participants of the survey conducted for the research presented in this study emphasised the need for legal reforms to address SLAPPs and protect media professionals. Press unions are called upon to provide economic, legal, and psychological support, as well as to raise awareness about the impact of SLAPPs on press freedom.
Despite the study’s limitations, including a small sample size and country-specific experiences (journalists from Greece and Cyprus participated in the survey), its findings shed light on the hidden costs of SLAPPs and the urgent need for comprehensive legal frameworks and institutional support to protect press freedom. Ultimately, SLAPPs represent a sophisticated form of censorship that undermines democracy and journalism’s role as a watchdog.
Papadopoulou, L., & Maniou, T. A. (2024). “SLAPPed” and censored? Legal threats and challenges to press freedom and investigative reporting. Journalism, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/14648849241242181
The vague and undefined concepts in the new Hungarian “sovereignty bill” aimed at countering “foreign interference,” and the powers of a new authority present a threat to independent media.
On December 12, the Hungarian Parliament approved a new bill focused on “protecting national sovereignty.” Although the ruling party, Fidesz, claims that the law aims to prevent “undue political interference” by foreign agents, a closer examination reveals potential threats to press freedom and concerns over undefined parameters within the legislation.
A central feature of the bill is the establishment of a Sovereignty Protection Authority (SPA), which is empowered to investigate “foreign interference,” including acts of disinformation that influence democratic debates. Notably, the law lacks explicit clarification on the definition of “foreign interference,” leaving the interpretation to the discretion of the authority. This ambiguity raises concerns about the potential inclusion of independent media organizations as targets, particularly given the government’s historical hostility towards such entities that receive foreign grants. These organizations have long been targeted by the government’s propaganda machine, which labels them as “dollarmedia” for accepting foreign funding.
Hungarian experts say that intentionally vague definitions and the inclusion of undefined concepts in the legislation serve a deterrent purpose. Drawing parallels with the media law, one of the first major legislations passed after Fidesz had regained power in 2010, the broad interpretation possibilities granted to the SPA could lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty, similar to the effects observed when the new media authority was established.
The legislation provides unclear guidance on potential sanctions, which range from publishing investigation results to initiating criminal proceedings. The SPA is granted sweeping powers, enabling it to interrogate any individual, scrutinize all data of the targeted organization (including confidential contracts and tax files), and summon its head before the Parliament’s National Security Committee. The alarming aspect is that the SPA operates outside the judicial system and lacks any form of oversight, which raises concerns about the potential misuse of power. Furthermore, it has also been revealed that a loyal Fidesz cadre has been nominated as the head of the SPA. This individual is also known for having served as the editor-in-chief of a government-friendly weekly a few years ago. During his tenure, the publication caused a scandal by publishing a list of “agents of George Soros” in Hungary.
The broad investigative authority of the SPA, coupled with the lack of oversight, could have a chilling effect on media organizations, especially smaller ones heavily reliant on foreign grants. The fear of investigations disrupting their operations may lead such organizations to reconsider applying for foreign funding, further challenging their sustainability within Hungary’s captured media landscape.
In an unprecedented move, ten independent Hungarian news organizations issued a joint statement a day after the passage of the bill. They argue that the legislation severely restricts press freedom, potentially making it difficult or even impossible for independent newsrooms, journalists, and media companies to operate effectively.
While some government officials had previously downplayed that the new bill would target free press, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban confirmed this in a recent statement on national radio. “The Sovereignty Protection Act makes it clear that loopholes will be closed, dollars cannot roll into the coffers of the left and the left’s media. It’s not fair that foreign money is used to influence people’s political decisions according to the interests of their sponsors,” he said.
As a worrisome development, Hungary is not the only country exhibiting increased scrutiny of foreign funding for independent media lately. In November, Azerbaijan, where President Ilham Aliyev is an ally of Orban, summoned U.S., German, and French envoys to protest against what it calls “illegal financial operations” targeting investigative news outlet Abzas Media. Three journalists from Abzas Media have been detained, and the charges against them include smuggling. During the raid on the outlet’s office, police claim to have found €40,000. Similar to Hungary, the crackdown was accompanied by a campaign in the government’s propaganda machine, accusing Abzas Media of illegally bringing undeclared foreign grants into the country.
These developments may mean that some donors will have to reconsider their grantmaking strategy, either out of caution or because grantees may urge them to do so to avoid unwanted repercussions. Hungarian media organizations receiving foreign funding will most likely be under scrutiny in the upcoming months, prompting some donors and implementers to find “innovative” solutions to continue operating in the country, development that we will document in the Journalism Funders Forum newsletter.